第11章-有市场势力的定价课件.ppt

1、Chapter 11Pricing with Market Power2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 112本章论题本章论题l攫取消费者剩余l价格歧视l跨期价格歧视和高峰定价l两部收费制l捆绑销售l广告2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 113前言前言l没有市场势力（完全竞争）的价格是由市场供给和需求决定的l单个生产者必须能够预测市场，然后专注于管理生产（成本）以使利润达到最大化2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 114前言前言l有市场势力的定价（不完全竞争市场）需要厂商懂得更多的需求的特

2、点2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 115攫取消费者剩余攫取消费者剩余l所有的定价策略都是攫取消费者剩余并将其转移给生产者的手段l在利润最大化点价格为P*、产量为Q*m但某些消费者愿意支付的价格可能高于P*l提高价格将失去一些消费者，导致利润降低l降低价格能争取一些消费者，但会降低利润2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 116攫取消费者剩余攫取消费者剩余Quantity$/QDMRPmaxMCPCThe firm would like to charge higher price to those consumers wil

3、ling to pay it-AP*Q*AP1Firm would also like to sell to those in area B but without lowering price to all consumersBP2Both ways will allow the firm to capture more consumer surplus2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 117攫取消费者剩余攫取消费者剩余l价格歧视（价格歧视（Price discrimination）是对同一商品向不同的消费者索取不同的价格m这要求能鉴别不同的消费者，并让他

4、们支付不同的价格l其他一些定价技术也能让企业获得更多的消费者剩余m两部收费制和捆绑消费2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 118价格歧视价格歧视l一级价格歧视m向每个消费者索取不同价格：消费者愿意支付的最大价格或保留价格l企业如何获利？m企业生产Q*MR=MCm企业的可变利润忽略固定成本的利润lMR和MC之间的区域m消费者剩余是需求曲线与价格之间的区域2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 119价格歧视价格歧视l如果企业能够实行完全价格歧视，它索取的价格正好是消费者愿意支付的价格mMR曲线不再是产量决策的一部分m增加的收益就是每

5、单位产品销售的价格需求曲线m生产并销售一单位产品的利润现在是需求曲线和边际成本之差2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1110P*Q*Without price discrimination,output is Q*and price is P*.Variable profit is the area between the MC&MR(yellow).一级价格歧视一级价格歧视Quantity$/QWith perfect discrimination,firm will choose to produce Q*increasing variable prof

6、its to include purple area.Consumer surplus is the area above P*and between0 and Q*output.PmaxD=ARMRMCQ*PC2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1111一级价格歧视一级价格歧视l 实际上，完全价格歧视几乎是不可能的1.向每个消费者索取不同的价格是不可行的（除非消费者人数极少）2.企业通常不知道每个消费者的保留价格l 但企业可以不完全歧视m 可以根据对保留价格的估计索取一些不同的价格2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1112

7、一级价格歧视一级价格歧视l当企业能够在某种程度上分割市场，并索取不同的价格时，就出现了不完全的价格歧视。例如：m律师、医生、会计师m企业销售人员（15%的利润空间）m大学（不同的财务援助）2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1113实践中的一级价格歧视实践中的一级价格歧视QuantityDMRMC$/QP2P3P1P5P6Six prices exist resultingin higher profits.With a single priceP*4,there are fewer consumers.P*4Q*Discriminating up to P6

8、(competitive price)will increase profits.2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1114二级价格歧视二级价格歧视l在一些市场，消费者在一段时间内要购买许多单位某种商品m但随着消费量的增加，该商品的需求下降l电力、水、取暖燃料m企业可以实施二级价格歧视（二级价格歧视（second-degree price discrimination）l是对同一种商品或服务不同购买量索取不同的价格2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1115二级价格歧视二级价格歧视l二级价格歧视的一个例子是数量折扣m例如：大

9、包装的便宜l分段定价（Block pricing，阶梯式定价）是对商品的不同数量“区段”制定不同的价格m例如电力、自来水2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1116二级价格歧视二级价格歧视$/QWithout discrimination:P=P0 and Q=Q0.With second-degree discrimination there are three blocks with prices P1,P2,&P3.QuantityDMRMCACP0Q0Q1P11st BlockP2Q22nd BlockP3Q33rd BlockDifferent pr

10、ices are charged for different quantities or“blocks”of same good.2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1117三级价格歧视三级价格歧视l 是将具有不同需求曲线的消费者分为两组或更多组，并对每组索取不同的价格。1.将市场分为两组2.每组有不同的需求函数2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1118三级价格歧视三级价格歧视l三级价格歧视是最常见的价格歧视类型m例如：打折机票、优惠与不优惠的烈酒、对学生和老人的折扣、冷冻与罐头食品2005 Pearson Educatio

11、n,Inc.Chapter 1119三级价格歧视三级价格歧视l可以根据消费者的一些特征来将其分组l最典型的，是根据需求弹性m大学生和老人因为收入低，通常支付意愿比其他人低m而这些人可以很容易地通过身份证件区分出来2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1120创造消费者群体创造消费者群体l 如果三级价格可行，那企业又如何决定每一组到底定价多少呢？1.总产量必须在各组之间进行分配，以使每一组的MR相等2.必须选择总产量，使每一组的MR与生产的MC相等2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1121三级价格歧视三级价格歧视l代数表示为：m

12、P1:第一组的价格mP2:第二组的价格mC(QT)=生产总成本mQT=Q1+Q2m利润：=P1Q1+P2Q2-C(QT)2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1122三级价格歧视三级价格歧视l企业必须把产量提高到每一组销售的最后一单位产品的边际利润为零l令第1组的边际利润=0MCQCMRQQPQCQQPQ1111111111)(0)(2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1123三级价格歧视三级价格歧视l对第一组的消费者，满足：mMR1=MCl同样，对第二组，满足：mMR2=MCl合并两个结论，得到：mMR1=MR2=MC2005

13、 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1124三级价格歧视三级价格歧视l确定相对价格m考虑每一组应该索取的相对价格，并将它们与需求的价格弹性联系起来，要容易一些11122212Recall:1 1Then:(1 1)(1 1)dMRPEMRPEMRPEE and E elasticitiesof demand for each group2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1125三级价格歧视三级价格歧视l确定相对价格m令MR1 和MR2 相等可以得到下面的价格必须满足的关系式m对需求弹性降低的消费者，应该索取较高的价格)E()E(PP

14、122111112005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1126三级价格歧视三级价格歧视l例子mE1=-2 and E2=-4mP1 应该是P2的1.5倍5.12/14/3)211()411(21PP 2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1127三级价格歧视三级价格歧视QuantityD2=AR2MR2$/QD1=AR1MR1Consumers are divided intotwo groups,with separatedemand curves for each group.MRTMRT=MR1+MR22005 Pearso

15、n Education,Inc.Chapter 1128三级价格歧视三级价格歧视QuantityD2=AR2MR2$/QD1=AR1MR1MRTMCQ2P2QT:MC=MRTGroup 1:more inelasticGroup 2:more elasticMR1=MR2=MCTQT control MCQ1P1MC=MR1 at Q1 and P1QTMCT2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1129不向较小的市场销售不向较小的市场销售l即使三级价格歧视是可能的，但有时同时向两组销售是不可行的m某一组的需求非常低，价格要降得很低才能在该组销售，但过低的价格可

16、能导致企业无利可图2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1130不向较小的市场销售不向较小的市场销售QuantityD2MR2$/QMCD1MR1Group one,with demand D1,is not willing to pay enoughfor the good to make price discrimination profitable.Q*P*MC=MR1=MR22005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1131优惠券和返还的经济学优惠券和返还的经济学l价格弹性更大的消费者，在购买产品时比更常使用优惠券和返还政策l

17、优惠券和返还政策可以使企业实施价格歧视2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1132优惠券和返还的经济学优惠券和返还的经济学l大约20 30%的消费者会使用优惠券或返还l这使企业获得那些需求弹性较高的消费者来购买商品。否则他们是不会购买的l表11.1说明了使用与不使用优惠券和返还的消费者的需求弹性的差异2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1133优惠券使用者与不使用者的需求价优惠券使用者与不使用者的需求价格弹性格弹性2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1134机票定价机票定价l需求弹性不同意味着

18、一些顾客愿意支付更高的机票款l商务旅行者几乎没什么选择，他们的需求较为缺乏弹性l休闲的旅客和家庭对价格更敏感，因此更有选择性2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1135航空旅行的需求弹性航空旅行的需求弹性2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1136机票定价机票定价l每条航线都有多种票价l通过对机票设定不同的限制，将市场进行细分m必须在周六住一晚m提前21天、提前14天m基本限制只能在特定的日期内改签m最贵没有限制头等舱2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1137其他类型的价格歧视其他类型的价格

19、歧视l跨期价格歧视m是将需求函数不同的消费者划分到不同的市场，并在不同的时点索取不同价格的行为。m首发产品，其需求是缺乏弹性的l精装书与平装书l首映的电影l新技术产品2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1138跨期价格歧视跨期价格歧视l一旦市场已经产生了最大利润，企业再降低价格吸引更富有弹性的需求l我们可以用两组不同的消费者的图示来说明一组愿意现在买、一组愿意等2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1139跨期价格歧视跨期价格歧视QuantityAC=MC$/QOver time,demand becomesmore elast

20、ic and price is reduced to appeal to the mass market.MR2D2=AR2Q2P2D1=AR1MR1P1Q1Initially,demand is lesselastic,resulting in a price of P1.2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1140其他类型的价格歧视其他类型的价格歧视l高峰定价m是在因能力限制导致边际成本更高的高峰期索取高价的定价策略。l一些产品的需求在某些特定时间会出现高峰m交通高峰期的道路和隧道m夏天傍晚的电力m周末的滑雪胜地2005 Pearson Education

21、,Inc.Chapter 1141高峰价格高峰价格l高峰定价的目标是通过向消费者索取更接近边际成本的价格以提高效率m因MC上升，MR必须上升，这意味着价格上调m因为价格更接近MC，所以总剩余更大m高峰定价能提高效率2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1142高峰价格高峰价格l三级价格歧视下，所有市场的MR是相等的l高峰定价时并非如此，因为两个市场间并无相互影响m每个市场的价格和销量是独立的m例如：电力、影剧院2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1143MR1D1=AR1MC高峰价格高峰价格P1Q1Quantity$/QMR2D

22、2=AR2Q2P2MR=MC for each group.Group 1 has higher demand during peak times.2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1144如何给畅销小说定价如何给畅销小说定价l如何给首次发行的精装书定价？m精装书和平装书是出版商进行价格歧视的手段m出版商如何给精装书和平装书定价呢？m他们如何决定合适发行平装书呢？2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1145如何给畅销小说定价如何给畅销小说定价l出版商必须将消费者分为两组：m愿意购买昂贵精装书的m愿意等待平装书出版的l这就需要

23、确定精装书发行后，何时再出平装书？m出版商一般等12至18个月2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1146如何给畅销小说定价如何给畅销小说定价l出版商必须用过去同类书的出版情况来给新书定价l所以很难确定新新书的需求l因此，大多数新书的定价都差不多l平装书的需求更富有弹性，所以其价格低些2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1147两部收费制两部收费制l Form of pricing in which consumers are charged both an entry and usage feemEx:amusement p

24、ark,golf course,telephone servicel A fee is charged upfront for right to use/buy the productl An additional fee is charged for each unit the consumer wishes to consumemPay a fee to play golf and then pay another fee for each game you play2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1148两部收费制两部收费制lPricing deci

25、sion is setting the entry fee(T)and the usage fee(P)lChoosing the trade-off between free-entry and high-use prices or high-entry and zero-use priceslSingle ConsumermAssume firm knows consumer demandmFirm wants to capture as much consumer surplus as possible2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1149Usag

26、e price P*is set equal to MC.Entry price T*is equal to the entire consumer surplus.Firm captures all consumer surplus as profit.T*只有一个消费者的两部收费只有一个消费者的两部收费Quantity$/QMCP*D2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1150两个消费者的两部收费两个消费者的两部收费l Two consumers,but firm can only set one entry fee and one usage feel

27、Will no longer set usage fee equal to MCmCould make entry fee no larger than CS of consumer with smallest demandl Firm should set usage fee above MCl Set entry fee equal to remaining consumer surplus of consumer with smaller demandl Firm needs to know demand curves2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter

28、1151D2=consumer 2D1=consumer 1Q1Q2The price,P*,will be greater than MC.Set T*at the surplus value of D2.两个消费者的两部收费两个消费者的两部收费Quantity$/QMCBC ABCtwice than more )(221*QQMCPTAT*2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1152有许多消费者的两部收费有许多消费者的两部收费lNo exact way to determine P*and T*lMust consider the trade-off b

29、etween the entry fee T*and the use fee P*mLow entry fee:more entrants and more profit from sales of itemmAs entry fee becomes smaller,number of entrants is larger and profit from entry fee will fall2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1153有许多消费者的两部收费有许多消费者的两部收费lTo find optimum combination,choose sever

30、al combinations of P and TlFind combination that maximizes profitlFirms profit is divided into two componentsmEach is a function of entry fee,T assuming a fixed sales price,P2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1154有许多消费者的两部收费有许多消费者的两部收费TProfita:entry fees:salesTotalT*Total profit is the sum of the pr

31、ofit from the entry fee andthe profit from sales.Both depend on T.entrantsnnQMCPTTnsa)()()(2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1155两部收费两部收费lRule of ThumbmSimilar demand:Choose P close to MC and high TmDissimilar demand:Choose high P and low TmEx:Disneyland in California and Disney world in Florida ha

32、ve a strategy of high entry fee and charge nothing for ride2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1156变形的两部收费制变形的两部收费制l Entry price(T)entitles the buyer to a certain number of free unitsmGillette razors sold with several bladesmAmusement park admission comes with some tokensmOn-line fees with free timel

33、 Can set higher entry fee without losing many consumersmHigher entry fee captures either surplus without driving them out of the marketmCaptures more surplus of large customers2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1157宝丽来相机宝丽来相机lIn 1971,Polaroid introduced the SX-70 cameralPolaroid was able to use two-

34、part tariff for pricing of camera/filmmAllowed them greater profits than would have been possible if camera used ordinary filmlPolaroid had a monopoly on cameras and film2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1158宝丽来相机宝丽来相机l Buying camera is like entry feel Unlike an amusement park,for example,the margi

35、nal cost of providing an additional camera is significantly greater than zerol It was necessary for Polaroid to have monopoly mIf ordinary film could be used,the price of film would be close to MCmPolaroid needed to gain most of its profits from sale of film2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1159宝丽来

36、相机宝丽来相机lAnalytical framework:cameras producing of costfilm producing of costsold cameras of numbersold film ofquantity camera of pricefilm of price)()()()(2121nCQCnQTPnCQCnTPQ2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1160宝丽来相机宝丽来相机lIn the end,the film prices were significantly above marginal costlThere was

37、 considerable heterogeneity of consumer demands2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1161移动电话费率移动电话费率l In most areas in US,consumers can choose cellular providers:Verizon,Cingular,AT&T and Sprintl Market power exists because consumers face switching costsmWhen they sign up with a firm,they must sign a

38、contract with high costs to breakl Plans often exist of monthly cost plus fee extra minutesl Companies can combine third-degree price discrimination with two-part tariff2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1162移动电话费率移动电话费率2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1163移动电话费率移动电话费率2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Ch

39、apter 1164捆绑销售捆绑销售lBundling is packaging two or more products to gain a pricing advantagelConditions necessary for bundlingmHeterogeneous customersmPrice discrimination is not possiblemDemands must be negatively correlated2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1165捆绑销售捆绑销售lWhen film company leased“Gone

40、with the Wind,”it required theaters to also lease“Getting Gerties Garter”lWhy would a company do this?mCompany must be able to increase revenuemWe can see the reservation prices for each theater and movie2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1166捆绑销售捆绑销售l Renting the movies separately would result in e

41、ach theater paying the lowest reservation price for each movie:mMaximum price Wind=$10,000mMaximum price Gertie=$3,000l Total Revenue=$26,000Gone with the Wind Getting Gerties GarterTheater A$12,000$3,000Theater B$10,000$4,0002005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1167捆绑销售捆绑销售lIf the movies are bundled:

42、mTheater A will pay$15,000 for bothmTheater B will pay$14,000 for bothlIf each were charged the lower of the two prices,total revenue will be$28,000lThe movie company will gain more revenue($2000)by bundling the movie2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1168相对评价相对评价lMore profitable to bundle because r

43、elative valuation of two films are reversedlDemands are negatively correlatedmA pays more for Wind($12,000)than B($10,000)mB pays more for Gertie($4,000)than A($3,000)2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1169相对评价相对评价lIf the demands were positively correlated(Theater A would pay more for both films as

44、shown)bundling would not result in an increase in revenueGone with the Wind Getting Gerties GarterTheater A$12,000$4,000Theater B$10,000$3,0002005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1170捆绑销售捆绑销售lIf the movies are bundled:mTheater A will pay$16,000 for bothmTheater B will pay$13,000 for bothlIf each were

45、charged the lower of the two prices,total revenue will be$26,000,the same as by selling the films separately2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1171捆绑销售捆绑销售lBundling Scenario:Two different goods and many consumersmMany consumers with different reservation price combinations for two goodsmCan show gra

46、phically the preferences of consumers in terms of reservation prices and consumption decisions given prices chargedmr1 is reservation price of consumer for good 1mr2 is reservation price of consumer for good 22005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1172保留价格保留价格r2r1$6$3.25Consumer A$10$10Consumer C$8.25$3

47、.25Consumer BFor example,Consumer A is willing to pay up to$3.25 for good 1 and up to$6 for good 2.2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1173产品分开销售时的消费决策产品分开销售时的消费决策r2r1P2IIConsumers buyonly Good 22211PRPRP1Consumers fall intofour categories basedon their reservationprice.IConsumers buyboth goods2211PR

48、PRIIIConsumers buyneither good2211PRPRIVConsumers buyonly Good 12211PRPR2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1174产品捆绑销售时的消费决策产品捆绑销售时的消费决策r2r1Consumers buy the bundlewhen r1+r2 PB(PB=bundle price).PB=r1+r2 or r2=PB-r1Region 1:r PBRegion 2:r PB)IIConsumers donot buy bundle(r PB)2005 Pearson Education,In

49、c.Chapter 1175产品捆绑销售时的消费决策产品捆绑销售时的消费决策lThe effectiveness of bundling depends upon the degree of negative correlation between the two demandsmBest when consumers who have high reservation price for Good 1 have a low reservation price for Good 2 and vice versamCan see graphically looking at positively

50、 and negatively correlated prices2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1176保留价格保留价格r2r1P2P1If the demands are perfectly positivelycorrelated,the firmwill not gain by bundling.It would earn the sameprofit by selling the goods separately.2005 Pearson Education,Inc.Chapter 1177保留价格保留价格r2r1If the demands a