天津大学模板课件.ppt

1、目录目录1.Introduction2.Literature Review3.Model 3.1 Repair Process and Inventory Policy 3.2 Cost Structure 3.3 Information Structure 3.4 Contract Types and Payoffs 3.5 Signaling Game4.Benchmark:First-Best Under Complete Information5.Signaling with Verifiable Inventory 5.1 Resource-Based Contract 5.2 Pe

2、rformance-Based Contract6.Signaling with Unverifiable Inventory 6.1 Resource-Based Contract 6.2 Performance-Based Contract7.Extensions:Efficiency Enhancement Strategies 7.1 Endogenizing Inventory Verifiability 7.2 Pooling Inventory Across Multiple Buyers8.Conclusions1.Introduction供货商买方产品PBCRBC可靠性私有信

3、息使用备用库存维护背景介绍背景介绍文献回顾文献回顾2.Literature Reviewl PBC for outsourced servicesl asymmetric information in operations managementl the use of warranties as a signaling mechanism建模建模3.Model3.1 Repair Process and Inventory PolicyN:identical copies;B:inventory backorder;s:inventory;The expected backorders in

4、steady state isAvailability is equal to 建模建模3.2 Cost StructureEach time a product failure occurs,the buyer incurs a fixed cost r 0.The buyers expected cost is equal toThe vendors expected cost is equal to建模建模3.3 Information StructureWe assume that the product offered by the vendor is one of two poss

5、ible types,L or H,where L denotes low reliability and H denotes high reliability.Hazard rate ordering（危险率序）:Excess wealth ordering（剩余财富序）:建模建模3.4 Contract Types and PayoffsWe can write the buyers expected payoff asThe vendors expected payoff is given byRBC:PBC:建模建模3.5 Signaling GameWe assume that th

6、e vendor,who possesses private information about the reliability of a newly developed product,chooses contract terms and proposes them to the buyer.The buyer then accepts the contract terms if his expected payoff exceeds an outside option valued at.We seek a perfect Bayesian equilibrium(PBE)that is

7、also renegotiation-proof.建模建模4.Benchmark:First-Best Under Complete InformationGiven the vendor type,the first-best outcome is obtained by solving the optimization problem.建模建模5.Signaling with Verifiable InventoryWe now consider the setting in which the vendor possesses private information about prod

8、uct reliability.5.1 Resource-Based ContractThe value of set by the vendor in her contract may relay information about whether or not the product is reliable.建模建模5.1 Resource-Based ContractIn summary,successful signaling by the reliable vendor is possible under RBC when her inventory choice is verifi

9、able,but it comes at a cost since the vendor has to leave positive surplus to the buyer.建模建模5.2 Performance-Based ContractTherefore,successful signaling by the reliable vendor can be done under both RBC and PBC when the inventory is verifiable.However,PBC presents an advantage because its risk shari

10、ng mechanism is more amenable to signaling than that of RBC.建模建模6.Signaling with Unverifiable Inventory6.1 Resource-Based ContractWith inventory no longer verifiable,the payoff functions for the vendor and the buyer under RBC remain the same as those of the verifiable inventory case.An underinvestme

11、nt in inventory causes economic inefficiency.建模建模6.2 Performance-Based ContractThe reliable vendor overinvests in inventory in equilibrium.Overall,we find that the interaction between the vendors discretionary inventory choice and her signaling incentive creates subtle dynamics that impact the relat

12、ive efficiency of after-sales service contracts in nontrivial ways.建模建模Which contract type will the reliable vendor prefer?Thus,the reliable vendor finds that the ability to signal her type with PBC more than compensates for the cost associated with overinvestment in inventory and any benefit presen

13、ted by RBC,which does not improve upon a pooling outcome.扩展扩展7.Extensions:Efficiency Enhancement Strategiesl Endogenizing Inventory Verifiabilityl Pooling Inventory Across Multiple Buyers结论结论8.ConclusionsSuggestions:The key to bring efficiency to the supply chain is inventory transparency.An alternative way to bring efficiency is to utilize inventory pooling,in case the vendor manages inventories across multiple buyers.谢谢！谢谢！