1、第第篇篇:战略实施战略实施第10章公司治理和道德IRELAND|HOSKISSON|HITTTHE MANAGEMENT OF STRATEGYCONCEPTS AND CASES 10ETHE STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT PROCESS 战略管理过程战略管理过程图 1.1战略管理过程KNOWLEDGE OBJECTIVESv1.Corporate governance v2.Separation of ownership and managerial control.v3.Agency Relationship,Agency Problemv4.Governance Mecha
2、nisms:three internal governance mechanisms external corporate governance mechanismv5.Corporate governance in international settings,especially in Germany,Japan,and China.学习目标1、公司治理定义、公司治理定义2、所有权与经营权分离、所有权与经营权分离3、代理关系、代理问题、代理关系、代理问题4、治理机制：三种内部机制、治理机制：三种内部机制 一种外部机制一种外部机制5、国际背景下各国公司治理的特点，以德国、国际背景下各国公司治
3、理的特点，以德国、日本和中国公司为例日本和中国公司为例vOPENING CASECORPORATE GOVERANCE:WHAT IS ALL THE FUSS ABOUT?CORPORATE GOVERANCE:WHAT IS ALL THE FUSS ABOUT?Corporate governance can destroy or create value for a firm.It is concerned with:1.strengthening the effectiveness of a companys board of directors2.verifying the tra
4、nsparency of a firms operations 3.enhancing accountability to shareholders4.incentivizing executives 5.maximizing value-creation for stakeholders and shareholders OPENING CASE OPENING CASE 公司治理：有什么可忙乱的？公司治理：有什么可忙乱的？公司治理会创造或损害公司价值公司治理会创造或损害公司价值公司治理关注的活动主要包括：（1）加强公司董事会的有效性；（2）核查公司运营的透明性；（3）提高对利益相关者的责任
5、；（4）有效地激励主管人员以及所有员工；（5）把公司为利益相关者，尤其是为股东创造价值的能力进行最大化。引导案例引导案例CORPORATE GOVERANCE:WHAT IS ALL THE FUSS ABOUT?CORPORATE GOVERANCE:WHAT IS ALL THE FUSS ABOUT?Given recent criticisms,boards actions in nations throughout the world are being more carefully scrutinized and regulated.In the U.S.,that after b
6、eing fired by their firm,a number of CEOs still remain as members of other firms boards of directors,is drawing close attention.Corporate governance is weak in many Chinese firms and there is concern about the validity and reliability of some auditors work and the quality of companies financial stat
7、ements.OPENING CASE OPENING CASE 公司治理：有什么可忙乱的？公司治理：有什么可忙乱的？鉴于最近的金融危机，各个国家对董事的行动都进行了严格的监管和控制。在美国，有许多CEO在被公司解雇后仍然保留着董事会成员的身份，这一事实引起了人们广泛的关注。许多中国公司的治理机制都很不完善，审计工作的有效性和可靠性以及公司财务报表的质量也遭到质疑。引导案例引导案例CORPORATE GOVERANCE:WHAT IS ALL THE FUSS ABOUT?CORPORATE GOVERANCE:WHAT IS ALL THE FUSS ABOUT?The reason the
8、re is a“fuss”about corporate governance is that these activities are critical to globally signaling transparency coupled with strategic competitiveness.Corporate governance fundamentals:Corporate Directors should:Focus on creating long-term value for shareholders Use performance-related pay to attra
9、ct and retain senior management Exercise sound business judgment to evaluate opportunities and manage risk Communicate with key shareholders OPENING CASE OPENING CASE 公司治理：有什么可忙乱的？公司治理：有什么可忙乱的？公司治理机制之所以会出现一些“忙乱”，原因在于，这些活动都是非常重要的，它们有助于国家向全世界展示其商业基础条件是符合有关透明度的国际标准，并且有助于证明公司在世界各国获取战略竞争力的能力。公司治理的根基:公司管理
10、者应该:一直关注于为股东创造长期价值。利用绩效工资来吸引和留住中高层管理者。利用良好的商业判断来评价各种机会以及风险管理。与股东进行沟通。引导案例引导案例 v1、CORPORATE GOVERNANCECORPORATE GOVERNANCEvCorporate governance:a set of mechanisms used to manage the relationships among stakeholders,and to determine and control the strategic direction and performance of organizations
11、.v公司治理机制：是指用来管理利益相关者之间的关系（以及利益冲突），决定并控制组织战略方向以及组织业绩的一套机制。公司治理v公司治理的目标是公司治理的目标是:确保高层管理者的利益与公司利益相关者(尤其是股东)的利益相一致.vWhen CEOs are motivated to act in the best interests of the firmparticularly,the shareholdersthe companys value should increase.v如果CEO以公司特别是股东利益最大化来采取行动，那么公司的价值就会有所增长。CORPORATE GOVERNANCEv
12、公司治理的核心：v寻找各种方法、机制来确保决策（特别是战略决策）的有效制定，并促使公司获得战略竞争力。v治理机制：三个内部机制，一个外部机制Theoretical basis for Corporate governance v2、SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND MANAGERIAL CONTROLSEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND MANAGERIAL CONTROLvBackround:vHistorically,firms managed by founder-owners and descendants.v历史上，美国的公司一直是由创立者兼所
13、有者以及他们的继任者来管理的。vSmall firms managers are high percentage owners,which implies less separation between ownership and management control.v小公司的管理者往往持有公司一大部分的所有权，因此，小公司的所有权和经营权分离的程度就比较低。SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND MANAGERIAL CONTROLvwhy separate?vAs Family-owned businesses grow,they may not have access
14、to all needed skills to manage the growing firm and maximize its returns,so may need outsiders to improve management.vThey may need to seek outside capital(whereby they give up some ownership control).所有权和经营权的分离v为什么会分离：v随着家族公司不断发展壮大，这些家族成员在有效管理公司并使家族回报最大化方面的技能会出现欠缺。v随着公司的发展，由于需要寻求外部资本，因而必须放弃一部分所有权。S
15、EPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND MANAGERIAL CONTROLMANAGERIAL CONTROLSeparation of ownership and managerial control Separation of ownership and managerial control allows each group to focus on what it does best:allows each group to focus on what it does best:Shareholders bear r
16、isk Shareholders bear risk Managers formulate and implement strategyManagers formulate and implement strategy 所有权和经营权的分离所有权和经营权的分离 所有权与经营权的分离使得：所有权与经营权的分离使得：股东承担风险股东承担风险管理者制定和实施战略管理者制定和实施战略SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND MANAGERIAL CONTROLvBasis of the modern corporation:vWe can be shareholders purchase
17、 stock,becoming residual claimants.vShareholder value reflected in price of stock.vProfessional managers are contracted to provide decision making.所有权和经营权的分离v现代公司的基础:v我们有机会成为股东，购买股票而成为剩余价值索取者。v股票价格反映了股东价值。v职业经理人通过签订合同来提供决策的制定。SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND MANAGERIAL CONTROL
18、MANAGERIAL CONTROLShareholders purchase stockShareholders purchase stockEntitled to income Entitled to income Risk bearing by shareholdersfirms Risk bearing by shareholdersfirms expenses may exceed revenuesexpenses may exceed revenuesInvestment risk is managed through a Investment risk is managed th
19、rough a diversified investment portfoliodiversified investment portfolioSHAREHOLDERSSHAREHOLDERSProfessional managers contracted to Professional managers contracted to provide decision makingprovide decision makingStrategy development and decision making Strategy development and decision making by m
20、anagers by managers MANAGERSMANAGERS所有权和经营权的分离所有权和经营权的分离股东管理者股东购买股票有权获得收入股东承担风险公司的支出可 能会超过收入通过多元化来管理投资风险职业经理人通过签订合同来提供决策制定制定战略和决策v思考：v所有权和经营权的分离会产生什么问题？所有权和经营权的分离产生两个问题：1、代理关系和代理问题2、代理成本和治理机制An Agency RelationshipCORPORATE GOVERNANCEvCorporate governance:a set of mechanisms used to manage the relati
21、onships among stakeholders,and to determine and control the strategic direction and performance of organizations.v公司治理机制：是指用来管理利益相关者之间的关系（以及利益冲突），决定并控制组织战略方向以及组织业绩的一套机制。SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND MANAGERIAL CONTROLMANAGERIAL CONTROLFIGURE 10.1 An Agency Relationship 所有权和
22、经营权的分离所有权和经营权的分离图10.1 代理关系AGENCY RELATIONSHIPSvManagerial opportunism:seeking self-interest with guile(i.e.,cunning or deceit)v管理机会主义是指通过欺诈（例如狡诈和欺骗）来谋求个人利益。vDecisions in managers best interests,contrary to shareholders best interestsv做出的决策是追求管理者利益最大化而不是股东利益最大化。Agency ProblemsAGENCY PROBLEMv当管理者（代理人）
23、作出的决策与股东（委托人）利益不一致时，就产生了代理问题（AGENCY PROBLEM）。vEXAMPLEs：vOVER DIVERSIFICATION AS AN EXAMPLE OF AN AGENCY PROBLEMvFREE CASH FLOW AS AN EXAMPLE OF AN AGENCY PROBLEM OVEROVER DIVERSIFICATION AS AN DIVERSIFICATION AS AN EXAMPLE OF AN EXAMPLE OF AN AGENCY PROBLEMAGENCY PROBLEMTwo benefits that accrue to t
24、op-level managers and Two benefits that accrue to top-level managers and not to shareholders:not to shareholders:1.Increase in firm size:1.Increase in firm size:product diversification product diversification usually increases the size of a firm;that size is usually increases the size of a firm;that
25、 size is positively related to executive compensation positively related to executive compensation 2.Firm portfolio diversification,which can reduce 2.Firm portfolio diversification,which can reduce top executives employment risktop executives employment risk.Diversification Diversification reduces
26、these risks because a firm and its managers reduces these risks because a firm and its managers are less vulnerable to reductions in demand are less vulnerable to reductions in demand associated with a single/limited number of associated with a single/limited number of businesses.businesses.代理问题的一个例
27、子代理问题的一个例子过度多元化过度多元化多元化可以为高层管理者带来两个股东享受多元化可以为高层管理者带来两个股东享受不到的好处：不到的好处：1.扩大公司规模扩大公司规模：产品多元化可以扩大公司的规产品多元化可以扩大公司的规模，而规模的扩大又可以为高层管理者带来积极的报模，而规模的扩大又可以为高层管理者带来积极的报酬。酬。2.降低职业风险降低职业风险：产品多元化可以：产品多元化可以降低管理者的降低管理者的职业风险。如：随着产品不断多元化，一个或几个产职业风险。如：随着产品不断多元化，一个或几个产品线上的产品或业务的需求下降，不会给公司造成太品线上的产品或业务的需求下降，不会给公司造成太大的影响，
28、因而也就降低了高层管理者的职业风险。大的影响，因而也就降低了高层管理者的职业风险。MANAGER AND SHAREHOLDER MANAGER AND SHAREHOLDER RISK AND DIVERSIFICATIONRISK AND DIVERSIFICATIONFIGURE 10.2 Manager and Shareholder Risk and Diversification 管理者与股东的风险和多元化管理者与股东的风险和多元化图 10.2 管理者与股东的风险和多元化 管理者与股东的风险和多元化管理者与股东的风险和多元化 多元化多元化股东倾向于更集中的多元化 管理者会更倾向于能
29、够使公司的规模和他们的薪酬都能得到最大化，同时也能降低职业风险的更高水平的多元化一般来讲，管理者所追求的公司多元化不会达到增加职业风险和降低雇用机会的水平 FREE CASH FLOW AS AN EXAMPLE FREE CASH FLOW AS AN EXAMPLE OF AN OF AN AGENCY PROBLEMAGENCY PROBLEMFree cash Free cash flow:low:resources remaining after the firm has invested in all projects within its current businesses.U
30、se of Free Cash FlowsUse of Free Cash Flows Managers Managers inclination to over-diversify and inclination to over-diversify and invest invest these funds in additional product diversificationthese funds in additional product diversification.Shareholders prefer Shareholders prefer distribution as d
31、ividends,so distribution as dividends,so they can control how the cash is investedthey can control how the cash is invested.代理问题的另一个例子代理问题的另一个例子自由现金流自由现金流自由现金流：自由现金流：公司投资于目前业务中所有公司投资于目前业务中所有的项目之后剩余的现金。的项目之后剩余的现金。自由现金流的使用产生代理问题：自由现金流的使用产生代理问题：高层管理者会将自由现金流投资于与公司高层管理者会将自由现金流投资于与公司当前业务不相关的产品线，以此来提高多元化当前
32、业务不相关的产品线，以此来提高多元化的水平。的水平。股东则更愿意将自由现金流以红利的形式股东则更愿意将自由现金流以红利的形式进行分配，这样他们就可以自己控制现金的投进行分配，这样他们就可以自己控制现金的投资方向。资方向。AGENCY COSTS AND GOVERNANCE MECHANISMSAGENCY COSTS AND GOVERNANCE MECHANISMSvAGENCY COSTS:the sum of incentive costs,monitoring costs,enforcement costs,and individual financial losses incurr
33、ed by principals,because governance mechanisms cannot guarantee total compliance by the agentv代理成本:是激励成本、监督成本、实施成本，以及由于治理机制无法保证代理人会完全“听命”而导致委托人遭受的财物损失的总和。vIn response,U.S.Congress enacted:vSarbanes-Oxley(SOX)Act in 2002 vDodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act(Dodd-Frank)in mid-201
34、0 v为了应对，美国国会颁布：v萨班斯奥克斯利（SOX）法案（2002年）v多德-弗兰克华尔街改革和消费者保护法（Dodd-Frank）（2010年）小知识：v萨班斯奥克斯利法案是美国立法机构根据安然有限公司、世界通讯公司等财务欺诈事件破产暴露出来的公司和证券监管问题所立的监管法规，简称SOX法案。v v萨班斯奥克斯利法案全称2002年公众公司会计改革和投资者保护法案由参议院银行委员会主席萨班斯（Paul Sarbanes）和众议院金融服务委员会（Committee on Financial Services）主席奥克斯利（Mike Oxley）联合提出。v对萨班斯-奥克斯利法案的批评，主要来
35、自某些企业与美国金融业者。他们认为该法案的一些规定过于严格，增大了企业（特别是小型企业）的审计成本，降低了其它国家企业到美国金融市场上市筹资的兴趣。v萨班斯奥克斯利（SOX）法案 的影响:v在美国股票交易所的上市的外国公司在减少，而同时，在国外上市的美国公司却在增加。v改善了对公司财务报告中内部审计的监管，从而增加了可信度。AGENCY PROBLEMS AGENCY PROBLEMS GOVERNANCE MECHANISMSGOVERNANCE MECHANISMS GOVERNANCE MECHANISMSAGENCY PROBLEMSAGENCY RELATIONSHIPS 代理问题代
36、理问题 治理机制治理机制 治理机制治理机制代理问题代理问题代理关系代理关系v4、GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS GOVERNANCE MECHANISMSGOVERNANCE MECHANISMSThree internal governance mechanisms and a single external one are used in the modern corporation.The three internal governance mechanisms are:1.Ownership Concentration,represented by types of sha
37、reholders and their different incentives to monitor managers 2.Board of Directors 3.Executive CompensationThe external corporate governance mechanism is:4.Market for Corporate ControlThis market is a set of potential owners seeking to acquire undervalued firms and earn above-average returns on their
38、 investments by replacing ineffective top-level management teams.治理机制治理机制 现代公司使用三种内部治理机制和一种外部现代公司使用三种内部治理机制和一种外部治理机制治理机制内部治理机制内部治理机制:1.所有权集中所有权集中2.董事会董事会3.管理者报酬管理者报酬外部治理机制：外部治理机制：4.公司控制权市场公司控制权市场 这是一个由潜在的所有者组成的市场，他们这是一个由潜在的所有者组成的市场，他们购买价值被低估的公司，替换无效的高层管理购买价值被低估的公司，替换无效的高层管理者，从而获得投资的超额回报者，从而获得投资的超额回报
39、内部治理机制内部治理机制v所有权集中v有大量股票被个人投资者和机构投资者所有。v董事会v由代表公司股东对高层管理者的战略决策进行监督的人组成。v管理者报酬v通过工资、奖金和长期激励，来使管理者和所有者的利益相一致。OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATIONOWNERSHIP CONCENTRATIONOwnershipOwnershipConcentrationConcentrationGovernance mechanism defined by both the number of large-block shareholders and
40、 the total percentage of shares ownedLarge block shareholders:shareholders owning a concentration of at least 5 percent of a corporations issued sharesLarge block shareholders have a strong incentive to monitor management closely 所有权集中所有权集中治理机制由公司大股东的数量治理机制由公司大股东的数量以及他们持有的公司股票的整以及他们持有的公司股票的整体比例所决定。体
41、比例所决定。大股东是指持有的公司股票在大股东是指持有的公司股票在5%以上的股东。以上的股东。大股东有强烈的监督管理者的大股东有强烈的监督管理者的意识。意识。OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATIONOWNERSHIP CONCENTRATIONOwnershipOwnershipConcentrationConcentrationInstitutional owners:financial institutions such as stock mutual funds and pension funds that control large block shareholder positi
42、ons。The growing influence of institutional owners。EXAMPLE：CalPERS 所有权集中所有权集中机构所有者机构所有者是指拥有公司大量是指拥有公司大量股权的金融机构，如共同基金股权的金融机构，如共同基金和养老基金。和养老基金。机构所有者的影响力越来越大。机构所有者的影响力越来越大。例如：加利福尼亚公职人员养例如：加利福尼亚公职人员养老金案例。老金案例。机构投资者的影响日益扩大：CalPERS case 加利福尼亚公职人员养老金案例Page 270思考：v请判断：v1、所有权的集中度越高，管理者的决策就越有可能实现股东价值最大化。v2、所有权
43、的集中度越高，越容易产生代理问题。BOARD OF DIRECTORS BOARD OF DIRECTORSBOARD OF DIRECTORSOwnershipOwnershipConcentrationConcentrationBoard of DirectorsBoard of DirectorsGroup of shareholder-elected individuals(usually called directors)whose primary responsibility is to act in the owners interests by formally monitor
44、ing and controlling the corporations top-level executives 董事会董事会董事会董事会是指由股东选举出的一些人组成的集体，他们的主要责任是通过正式地监督和控制高层管理者来实现股东利益最大化BOARD OF DIRECTORSvAs stewards of an organizations resources,an effective and well-structured board of directors can influence the performance of a firm:v Oversee managers to ensu
45、re the company is operated in ways to maximize shareholder wealthv Punish and reward managersv Protect shareholders rights and interestsv Protect owners from managerial opportunism董事会的作用v作为组织资源的支配者，一个有效的、结构合理的董事会会影响公司的业绩:v 监督管理者，以保证公司的运营能够使股东财富最大化。v 对管理进行惩罚和奖励。v保护股东的权利和利益。v避免管理机会主义。BOARD OF DIRECTOR
46、SBOARD OF DIRECTORSOwnershipOwnershipConcentrationConcentrationBoard of DirectorsBoard of DirectorsThree director classifications:Insider,related outsider,and outsider:Insiders:the firms CEO and other top-level managersRelated outsiders:individuals uninvolved with day-to-day operations,but who have
47、a relationship with the firmOutsiders:individuals who are independent of the firms day-to-day operations and other relationships 董事会的组成董事会的组成董事会成员的三种类型：董事会成员的三种类型：内部董事内部董事:公司的公司的CEO和和其他高层管理者其他高层管理者 相关独立董事：相关独立董事：不参与公不参与公司的日常经营活动，但是司的日常经营活动，但是与公司存在着某种关系与公司存在着某种关系独立董事：独立董事：既不参与公司既不参与公司的日常经营活动，与公司的日常经营
48、活动，与公司也没有任何关系也没有任何关系 董事会新进展董事会新进展 一直以来都是内部董事主导着一直以来都是内部董事主导着董事会：董事会：管理者有时会利用权力来选择和管理者有时会利用权力来选择和奖励主管奖励主管 证券交易委员会提议，要求由独证券交易委员会提议，要求由独立董事来组成审计委员会立董事来组成审计委员会萨班斯萨班斯奥克斯利法案奥克斯利法案 的通的通过导致了董事会的改变过导致了董事会的改变董事会机制的调整使公司治理机董事会机制的调整使公司治理机制更严格制更严格董事会丑闻使得董事会丑闻使得CEO和董事会主和董事会主席的角色开始分离席的角色开始分离vEnhancing the effectiv
49、eness of the Board of Directors:v Increase the diversity of the backgrounds of board members(e.g.,public service,academic,scientific;ethnic minorities and women;different countries)v Strengthen internal management and accounting control systemsv Establish and consistently use formal processes to eva
50、luate the boards performancev提高董事会的有效性:v 1、增加董事会成员背景的多样性（例如，在美国公司的董事会中，有更多的董事来自公共服务业、学术界和科研机构；有更多的少数民族和女性董事，以及来自不同国家的董事）。v2、加强内部管理和财务控制系统。v3、建立并持续使用正式的流程来评估董事会的表现。v4、设立“领导董事”职位该职位在制定董事会日程和监督非管理者董事会成员方面拥有很大的权力 v5、要求独立董事拥有相当比例的所有权，从而能够更关注股东利益EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION EXECUTIVE COMPENSATIONEXECUTIVE COMPE
