1、罗森第九版英文财政学配套罗森第九版英文财政学配套 全册完整教学课件全册完整教学课件 CHAPTER 1 Introduction Copyright 2010 by the McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. McGraw-Hill/Irwin 1-3 Defining the Field of Study Public Finance the field of economics that analyzes government taxation and spending policies Public Sector Econom
2、ics see definition above Public Economics see definition above What is not part of public finance? 1-4 Public Finance and Ideology Organic view of government Mechanistic view of government 1-5 The Legal Framework Federal government Federal Constitutional provisions Article 1, Section 8 Article 1, Se
3、ction 9 16th Amendment 5th Amendment 1-6 The Legal Framework State governments Federal constitutional provisions 10th amendment The State constitutions Local governments Derive power to tax and spend from the States Fiscal independence of local governments 1-7 The Size of Government How to measure t
4、he size of government Number of workers Annual expenditures Types of government expenditure Purchases of goods and services Transfers of income Interest payments Budget documents Unified budget Regulatory budget 1-8 State, Local, and Federal Government Expenditures (selected years) 1234 Total Expend
5、itures (billions) 2008 Dollars (billions)* 2008 Dollars per capita Percent of GDP 19601237143,95023.3% 19702951,3086,37928.4% 19808431,9058,36730.2% 19901,8732,80411,21032.2% 20002,8873,52712,48729.4% 20084,7234,72315,48833.1% *Conversion to 2008 dollars done using the GDP deflator Source: Calculati
6、ons based on Economic Report of the President, 2009 pp. 282,286,325,381. Adjusting for Inflation Adjusting for Population Relative to Economy 1-9 Government Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP (2008) United States Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 2008a. 1-10 Composition
7、of Federal Expenditures (1965 and 2008) Note decline in Defense Note increase in Social Security, Medicare and Income Security Source: Economic Report of the President, 2009 p. 379. 1-11 Source: Economic Report of the President 2009, p. 389. Composition of State it depends on market conditions and t
8、he state of technology impure public good A commodity can satisfy one part of the definition of a public good but not the other Some things that are not conventionally thought of as commodities have public good characteristics Private goods are not always provided only by the private sector publicly
9、 provided private goods Public provision of a good does not necessarily mean that it is also produced by the public sector 1-55 Some Other Public Goods Basic research Programs to fight poverty Uncongested non-toll roads Fireworks display 1-56 Efficient Provision of Private Goods PriceAdam (DfA) Eve
10、(DfA) Market (DfA+E) $11516 $97310 $79514 $511718 $313922 $1151126 1-57 DfA DfE DfA+E Sf $ Quantity of Pizza4-57 1-58 Pareto Efficiency Private Goods Case MRSfa = Pf/Pa Set Pa = $1 MRSfa = Pf DfA shows MRSfa for Adam DfE shows MRSfa for Eve Sf shows MRTfa Necessary condition for Pareto efficiency: M
11、RSfaAdam = MRSfaEve = MRTfa 1-59 Efficient Provision of Public Goods Units of Fireworks 1234 Adam (DrA)$300$250$200$150 Eve (DfE) 250 200 150 100 Market (DfA+E) $550$450$350$250 1-60 DrA DrE DrA+E Sr Quantity of Fireworks $ 4-60 1-61 Pareto Efficiency Public Goods Case MRSfa = Pf/Pa Set Pa = $1 MRSf
12、a = Pf DfA shows MRSfa for Adam DfE shows MRSfa for Eve Sf shows MRTfa Necessary condition for Pareto efficiency: MRSfaAdam + MRSfaEve = MRTfa 1-62 Problems Achieving Efficiency The Free-Rider Problem Solutions to the free-rider problem Perfect price discrimination Policy Perspective: Global Positio
13、ning System Do people free ride? 1-63 Laboratory Experiments and Free-Riding How a typical experiment works Typical results People contribute about 50% of resources to provision of public good Contributions fall the more often the game is repeated Cooperation fostered by prior communication Contribu
14、tion rates decline when opportunity cost of giving goes up “Warm-glow” giving 1-64 The Privatization Debate Privatization taking services supplied by government and turning them over to the private sector Public v Private Provision: What is the right mix? Relative wage and materials costs Administra
15、tive costs Diversity of tastes 1-65 Distributional Issues Commodity egalitarianism notion that some commodities ought to be made available to everyone 1-66 Public versus Private Production Efficiency of private production Problems in comparing cost differences Incomplete contracts Competition to sup
16、ply good or service Reputation building Policy Perspective: Should airport security be produced publicly or privately? Market Environment 1-67 Preference Revelation Mechanisms TEve = MRTra (MRSraTotal MRSraEve) Eves choice: TEve = MRSraEve By substitution: MRTra (MRSraTotal MRSraEve) = MRSraEve Add
17、(MRSraTotal MRSraEve) to both sides: MRTra = MRSraTotal CHAPTER 5 Externalities Copyright 2010 by the McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.McGraw-Hill/Irwin 1-69 Externalities Externality An activity on one entity that affects the welfare of another entity in a way that is outside the mar
18、ket mechanism Not an Externality suburban-urban migration example 1-70 The Nature of Externalities Privately-owned versus commonly-owned resources Externalities can be produced by consumers as well as firms Externalities are reciprocal in nature Externalities can be positive Public goods can be view
19、ed as a special kind of externality 1-71 The Nature of Externalities-Graphical Analysis Q per year $ MB 0 MD MPC MSC = MPC + MD Q1Q* Actual output Socially efficient output a b c d f e g h 1-72 What Pollutants Do Harm? Empirical Evidence: What is the Effect of Pollution on Health? What Activities Pr
20、oduce Pollutants? What is the Value of the Damage Done? Empirical Evidence: The Effect of Air Pollution on Housing Values 1-73 Bargaining and the Coase Theorem Q per year $ MB 0 MD MPC MSC = MPC + MD Q1Q* c d g h 1-74 The Coase Theorem Coase Theorem Provided that transaction casts are negligible, an
21、 efficient solution to an externality problem is achieved as long as someone is assigned property rights, independent of who is assigned those rights Assumptions necessary for Coase Theorem to work The costs to the parties of bargaining are low The owners of resources can identify the source of dama
22、ges to their property and legally prevent damages 1-75 Other Private Solutions Mergers Social conventions 1-76 Public Responses to Externalities - Taxes Q per year $ MB 0 MD MPC MSC = MPC + MD Q1Q* c d (MPC + cd) Pigouvian tax revenues i j 1-77 Public Responses to Externalities - Subsidies Q per yea
23、r $ MB 0 MD MPC MSC = MPC + MD Q1Q* c d (MPC + cd) i j g k h f e Pigouvian subsidy 1-78 Public Responses to Externalities- Emissions Fee 0 Pollution reduction MSB MC e* f* $ 1-79 Emissions Fees Continued- Uniform Pollution Reductions Barts pollution reduction Homers pollution reduction 507590507590
24、MCB MCH 25 f = $50 f = $50 Barts Tax Payment Homers Tax Payment 1-80 Public Responses to Externalities- Cap-and-Trade Barts pollution reduction Homers pollution reduction 507590507590 MCB MCH 25 f = $50 f = $50 10 a b 1-81 Cap-and-Trade vs. Emissions Fee 0 Pollution reduction MSB MC* e* f* $ MC efe
25、Too much pollution reductionToo little pollution reduction 1-82 Cap-and-Trade v Emissions Fee 0 Pollution reduction MC* e* f* $ MC efe MSB Too much pollution reductionToo little pollution reduction 1-83 Emissions Fee v Cap-and-Trade Responsiveness to Inflation Responsiveness to Cost Changes Responsi
26、veness to Uncertainty Distributional Effects Emissions fee Cap-and-Trade Policy Perspective: Addressing Climate Change 1-84 Command-and-Control Regulation Incentive-based regulations Command-and-control regulations Technology standard Performance standard Is command-and-control ever better? Hot spot
27、s 1-85 The U.S. Response Clean Air Act 1970 amendments Command-and-control in the 70s How well did it work? 1-86 Progress with Incentive-Based Approaches Policy Perspective: Cap-and-Trade for Sulfur Dioxide 1-87 Implications for Income Distribution Who Benefits? Who Bears the Cost? 1-88 Positive Ext
28、ernalities Research per year $ MPB MC MEB MSB = MPB + MEB R*R1 1-89 A Cautionary Note Requests for subsidies Resource extracted from taxpayers Market does not always fail Policy Perspective: Owner-Occupied Housing CHAPTER 6 Political Economy Copyright 2010 by the McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All righ
29、ts reserved.McGraw-Hill/Irwin 1-91 Direct Democracy-Unanimity Rules r per year0 0 Adams share (SA) Eves share (SE) DrA The Lindahl Model DrE r* S* 1-92 Feasibility of Unanimity Rules Reaching equilibrium Practical problems Strategic behavior Time to reach equilibrium 1-93 Direct Democracy-Majority V
30、oting Rules Majority voting rule one more than half of the voters must favor a measure for it to be approved Voter ChoiceBradJenAngelina FirstACB SecondBBC ThirdCAA 1-94 Direct Democracy-Majority Voting Rules Voting Paradox community preferences can be inconsistent even though individuals preference
31、s are consistent Agenda Manipulation process of organizing order of votes to ensure a favorable outcome Cycling when paired voting on more than two possibilities goes on indefinitely without a conclusion ever being reached Voter ChoiceBradJenAngelina FirstACB SecondBAC ThirdCBA 1-95 Graphing Prefere
32、nces Missiles Utility ABC Brad Jen Angelina Single-peaked preferences Double-peaked preferences 1-96 Practical Importance of Double- Peaked Preferences Availability of private substitutes Issues ranked along single dimension 1-97 Direct Democracy - The Median Voter Theorem VoterExpenditure Donald$5
33、Daisy100 Huey150 Dewey160 Louie700 1-98 Direct Democracy - Logrolling I Voter ProjectMelanieRhettScarletTotal Net Benefits Hospital200-50-5595 Library-40150-3080 Pool-120-60400220 1-99 Direct Democracy - Logrolling II Voter ProjectMelanieRhettScarletTotal Net Benefits Hospital200-110-105-15 Library-
34、40150-120-10 Pool-270-140400-10 1-100 Direct Democracy - Arrows Impossibility Theorem “Reasonable” collective decision-making criteria It can produce a decision whatever the configuration of voters preferences It must be able to rank all possible outcomes It must be responsive to individuals prefere
35、nces It must be consistent Independence of irrelevant alternatives Dictatorship ruled out Arrows Impossibility Theorem All conceivable voting schemes have some potential for being unfair or producing a paradoxical result Meaning of theorem consistent rule not necessarily impossible to find, but cann
36、ot be guaranteed Buchanans critique Use of social welfare functions 1-101 Representative Democracy - Elected Politicians Number of Voters LiberalConservative 1-102 Implications of the Median Voter Model Two-party systems tend to be stable Replacement of direct referenda by representative system has
37、no effect on outcomes 1-103 Other Factors Influencing Voting Single-dimensional rankings Ideology Personality Leadership Decision to vote 1-104 Representative Democracy-Public Employees Function of bureaucrats Goals of bureaucrats 1-105 Niskanens Model of Bureaucracy Q per year $ 0 V C Q* Efficient
38、output Qbc Actual output 1-106 Representative Democracy Special Interests What are “Special Interests”? Establishment of Special Interest Groups Source of Income: Capital or Labor Size of Income Source of Income: Industry of Employment Region Demographic and Personal Characteristics 1-107 Representa
39、tive Democracy Rent- Seeking tons of peanuts per year $ S=MC D MR Rents 1-108 Representative Democracy Other Actors Judiciary Journalists Experts 1-109 Explaining Government Growth Citizen Preferences G = f(P, I) Marxist View Chance Events Changes in Social Attitudes Income Redistribution 1-110 Cont
40、rolling Government Growth Government growth as a non-issue Government growth as a problem Commitments made in the past Basic flaws in the political system 1-111 Improving the Workings of the Political System Change bureaucratic incentives Financial incentives Privatization Change Fiscal Institutions
41、 Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) 1990 Balanced Budget rules at the state level Institute Constitutional Limitations Balanced Budget amendment 1-112 Provisions of a Typical Balanced Budget Amendment 1.Congress must adopt a budget statement “in which total outlays are no greater than total receipts” 2.To
42、tal receipts may not increase “by a rate greater than the rate of increase in national income” 3.“The Congress and President shallensure that actual outlays do not exceed the outlays set forth in the budget statement” 4.The provisions can be overridden in times of war 1-113 Critique of Balanced Budg
43、et Amendments Forecasting issues Definitional issues Penalties for violation of the law Economic issues CHAPTER 7 Education Copyright 2010 by the McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. McGraw-Hill/Irwin 1-115 Real Annual Expenditure Per Pupil in Public Elementary and Secondary Schools Sour
44、ce: US Bureau of the Census 2009, p. 151 1-116 Justifying Government Intervention in Education Is Education a Public Good? Does Education Generate Positive Externalities? The Conventional Wisdom The Case Against the Conventional Wisdom The Case of Higher Education Is the Education Market Inequitable
45、? Commodity Egalitarianism 1-117 What Can Government Intervention in Education Accomplish? Should public education be free and compulsory? Should government produce public education? 1-118 Does Government Intervention Crowd Out Private Education? Quantity of Education Quantity of all other goods A B
46、 i e0ep ii x Private School quantity of education Public schooling “crowds out” education 1-119 Does Government Intervention Crowd Out Private Education? Quantity of Education Quantity of all other goods A B i e0ep ii x Public schooling increases quantity of education 1-120 Does Government Intervent
47、ion Crowd Out Private Education? Quantity of Education Quantity of all other goods A B i e0ep ii x Public schooling does not increase quantity of education 1-121 Does Government Spending Improve Educational Outcomes? SOURCE: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 2007a. Real Annual Ex
48、penditures on Private and Public Schools, All Levels of Education (2007) 1-122 Does Government Spending Improve Educational Outcomes? Comparative educational outcomes Empirical Evidence: Does Spending on Education Improve Student Test Scores? 1-123 Public Spending and the Quality of Education Empiri
49、cal Evidence: Does Reducing Class Size Improve Student Test Scores? Measuring costs Measuring benefits Project STAR California 1-124 Does Education Increase Earnings? Link between higher spending on education and earnings Elementary and secondary education outcomes Influence of age and economic stat
50、us Spending on the margin 1-125 New Directions for Public Education- Charter Schools Charter Schools - public schools operating under special state charters that permit experimentation and allow independence Empirical evidence Diversity of choice Student outcomes 1-126 New Directions for Public Educ
