1、CHINAS NEW ROLE IN AFRICAIan TaylorSchool of International Relations,University of St AndrewsFrom Chinas New Role in Africa,published by Lynne Rienner Publishers this year Material and ideas based on fieldwork and interviews I conducted in:Botswana,Cape Verde,Eritrea,EthiopiaThe Gambia,Mauritius,Nam
2、ibiaNigeria,Senegal,Sierra LeoneSouth Africa,Uganda,Zambia,ZimbabweChina(Beijing and Hong Kong)London and Washington,DC.CONTENTS OF BOOK1.CHINAS AFRICA POLICY IN CONTEXT2.OIL DIPLOMACY3.THE IMPACT OF CHEAP CHINESE GOODS4.THE ISSUE OF HUMAN RIGHTS5.ARMS SALES6.PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA7.WHAT DOES IT ALL
3、 MEAN?OILOil dominates the profile of Africas exports to China(around 70%)Chinas dependence on imported oil rose to 47%of annual demand,anincrease of 4.1 percent since 2019-expected to rise to around 60%by2020FIVE KEY WAYS BEIJING SEEKS TO LESSEN PRESSUREIncreased energy conservation(this will only
4、moderate growth in consumption)Fuel switchingreducing the dependence on imported fuels by switching to renewable energy and coal,of which China has large domestic reserves(but the environment)Increase in domestic oil production by seeking out new resources and exploiting existing ones more efficient
5、ly(there have been new discoveries within China but not enough to satisfy demand).Beijing encourages national oil companies(NOCs)to increase purchases in international oil marketsBeijing facilitates acquisition of oil reserves abroad through“sweetener deals”with foreign governmentsHowever,liberaliza
6、tion has resulted in a shift ofpower away from Beijing toward NOCs The ability by Beijing to tell the NOCs what to do islimited Question:Are particular ventures a result ofBeijing directing an NOC or the NOC seekingdiplomatic assistance once it has identified atarget oilfield?China lacks a central m
7、inisterial agencyoverseeing the oil industryPROBLEM:Beijing has as yet been incapable of enforcinga geographical division of labour on the mainNOCsResult:competition and overlap between:China National Petroleum Corporation(CNPC)China Petroleum&Chemical Corporation(Sinopec)China National Offshore Oil
8、 Company(CNOOC)Example CNPC and China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation(Sinopec)competed against each other for a pipeline project in Sudan.The NOCs in fact view one another as rivals,competing not only for oil and gas assets,but alsofor political advantage.The more high-quality assets a company ac
9、quires,the more likely it is to obtain diplomatic andfinancial support from Beijing for its subsequentinvestments.especially true for CNOOC,which does not have as much political influence as CNPC and SinopecThis inter-firm competition is normal in the capitalist West,obviously,but puts a different t
10、ake on“China Inc.”and its“oil strategy”in Africa.Problem:the NOCs have the reputation to let theChinese government take the dangerous consequencesengendered by their foreign-oil and gas questThus commercial interests of Chinese NOCs can riskdamaging Chinese governments diplomacy andinternational rep
11、utation overseas-Same as some Western oil companies behaveBut government control over the actions of Chinese NOCsin Africa not be as easy as many seem to think in the WestIMPACT OF CHINESE IMPORTSOne of the more contentious issues in Sino-African relationsCheap manufactured goods blamed for decline
12、in African exportsparticularly of clothing and textilesAfrican imports from China 712%jump from$895m in 2019 to$7.3bn in 2019Many African observers see this as the cause of decline of Africas manufacturing sector“Africa is becoming a dumping ground while African companies are dying”-quote from an Af
13、rican newspaperINTERNATIONAL DYNAMICSAfrican Growth and Opportunity Act(AGOA)(May 2000)offered incentives for African countries to open theireconomies and build“free markets”Modifications made permitting least developed Africancountries to employ materials from the cheapest contractorsworldwideEffec
14、t was that global apparel industry took advantage ofAfricas unexploited quota access to EU and US via“quotahopping”“Quota hopping”various foreign companies,mostly Asian,set themselves up inAfrica as a means to evade the obstacles placed on them by theMulti-Fibre Agreement The MFA allocated export qu
15、otas to low-cost developing countriesand limited amount of imports for states whose domestic textileindustries were negatively affected targeted at imports from Asia and particularly ChinaTriangular production networks thus developed whereby Asianfirms made products in Africa for export to Western m
16、arkets Result:African exports of textiles and clothing to US boomedIn 2000,apparel exports to US=$776 m;by 2019=$1,782 m-increase of 130%HOWEVER,this was artificial-vast majority of“African”clothing being exported to US was made using foreign fabrics:Lesotho=98%Madagascar=92%Kenya=98%Mauritius=64%Sw
17、aziland=98%South Africa=68%Namibia=96%Malawi=95%Botswana=99%Since China is now being held“responsible”for post-MFA collapseof Africas clothing industry,we shouldnote that a sizeable proportion of thefabric in question was actually ChineseCLOTHINGS“BIG BANG”MFA expired January 1,2019,affecting 87%of
18、US quotas and 73%of EUsMarket share enjoyed by African exporters now taken over byChinese manufacturers-also,many Chinese companies that hadrelocated to Africa during the MFA moved back to ChinaAfrican textile and clothing manufacturers exports to US fell by 16%from 2019-05US imports from China went
19、 up by 44%EU imports from China went up by 78%IS AFRICA COMPETITIVE?Very difficult to assess whether African textiles could competewith Chinese imports because the playing field is not level African manufacturers have to contend with chronic energyand transport issuesExample:Nigeria has worlds 10th
20、largest reserve of gas butgenerates only 3,000 mw of electricity,even though domesticdemand is 6,000 mw Cost of doing business high and products expensiveWorld Bank:if Zambian and Kenyan powersystems were of same quality as the Chinesethe cost savings for Zambian and Kenyanfirms would be equivalent
21、to their entire wagebillsSouth Africa has been losing clothing jobssince acceding to the WTO-the industry washighly protected during apartheid but isbasically uncompetitive todayThe popular imageTHE REALITY Africas industries have been in decline for a long time Between 1975-2000,Ghanas textile outp
22、ut feel by 50%and employment in the sector by 80%In Zambia,employment in the clothing and textile sector fell from 25,000 in 1980s to below 10,000 in 2019 In Kenya,number of large-scale garment manufacturers dropped from 110 in 1980s to 55 in 2000s Africas textile exporting success in mid-2000s was
23、an artificial boom for an industry that lost its competitive edge long ago Only factor supporting the growth of much of Africas export-oriented clothing sector=preferential access to overseas markets When these privileges were abolished,Africas success in the clothing and textile sectors evaporated
24、Poor organizational procedures,low levels of skill,and inadequate management Ghanaian manufacturers of textiles have to face the imposition of an illegal 20%duty by Cte dIvoire,a“transit tax”collected at Benin and extortion by Nigerian authorities Poor packaging,poor finishing of products(quality/co
25、nformity to standards),inability of some manufacturers to meet export orders on schedule also come into playWorld Bank estimates that the cost of doing business inAfrica is 2040%above that for other developing regionsdue to:-Unpredictable property rights-Ineffective/corrupt judiciary systems-policy
26、uncertainty-unfair competition from politically connected companies,which results in a few large firms holding very dominant market shares Finished goods from China are arriving into African markets with few domestic competitors,wiped out not only by low prices of Chinese imports but by African cond
27、itions BUT“the Chinese”are being blamed for African governments failings Policymakers in Beijing will have to address negative impressions Big challenge=increasing Sinophobic resentment vs.Chinese traders whose products dominate local African marketsKEY POINTSTwo main points stand out:1.Degree of ir
28、rational hostility to China in Africa.2.It is up to African leaders to manage their relations with China to benefit their own economies and citizensIRRATIONAL HOSTILITYChinese trade with Africa has become,in many ways,normalized,which is to say diverse,and involvingmultiple actors,rather than state
29、directed and controlledYet people still talk of“China”in Africa,as if all actionsby Chinese actors represents official Chinese foreign policy Much of Africas manufacturing industry collapsed longago,well before Chinese imports appeared on the sceneBesides,it is not only African producers who have ha
30、dto adjust to competition between 2019 and 2019,more than 15 million factory jobs,representing 15%of the total manufacturing workforce,were lost in China It is possible that some Chinese exports may block avenues for Africas diversification away from its traditional exports If Africa is to escape it
31、s dependent relationship on the global economy and move on from being simply an exporter of primary commodities,it needs to start manufacturing But domestic problems figure more significantly in African manufacturers plight Plus,Africans themselves import a huge amount of Chinese-made products-go to
32、 Yiwu!Those that are shoddy or counterfeit should be regulated and controlled by African governments But these corrupt governments instead prefer to blame“China.”Beijings engagement with Africa is grounded in pragmatism it is up to each African state to decide how and where it takes shapeChinas aban
33、donment of ideology for economic growth gives Africa greater room to manoeuvrebut Africas elites must do so wisely,with an eye toward mutual benefitIn some countries,they willIn others,however,predatory elites at the apex of neopatrimonial regimes,unconcerned with promoting development,will forfeit the chance to make the most of renewed Chinese interest in Africa THE END
