1、Chapter 13Renewable Common-Property Resources:Fisheries And Other Species13.1 IntroductionMain contents:Defining what is meant by an efficient allocation of the catch from a fishery.Examining how the market allocates this common-property resource and the past and potential roles for public policies
2、in quest for efficient and sustainable management.Showing how the basic analytical principles of fisheries management could be used for the management of other biological population.13.2 Efficient Allocations13.2.1 Biological Dimension13.2.2 Static Efficient Sustainable Yield13.2.3 Dynamic Efficient
3、 Sustainable Yield13.2.1 Biological DimensionThe biological model posits a particular average relationship between the growth of the fish population and the size of the fish population.Figure 13.113.2.1 Biological DimensionThe natural equilibrium is the population size which would persist in the abs
4、ence of outside influences.The minimum viable population represents the level of population below which growth in population is negative.A sustainable yield represents the catch level which equals the growth rate of the population.13.2.1 Biological DimensionThe maximum sustainable yield is defined a
5、s that population size which yields the maximum growth;hence the maximum sustainable yield is equal to this maximum growth and it represents the largest catch that can be perpetually sustained.13.2.2 Static Efficient Sustainable YieldIs the maximum sustainable yield synonymous with efficiency?The an
6、swer is no.Efficiency is associated with maximizing the net benefit from the use of resource.If we are to define the efficient allocation,we must include the costs of harvesting as well as the benefits.Figure 13.213.2.3 Dynamic Efficient Sustainable YieldWhen positive discount rates are introduced,t
7、he efficient level of effort would be increased beyond that suggested by the static efficient sustained yield with a corresponding decrease in the equilibrium population level.13.2.3 Dynamic Efficient Sustainable YieldWould a dynamically efficient management scheme lead to extinction of the fishery?
8、If the growth rate is lower than the discount rate,extinction can occur in an efficient management scheme if the costs of extracting the last unit are sufficiently low.13.3 Appropriability And Market SolutionsConsider the allocation resulting from a fishery managed by a competitive sole owner.A sole
9、 owner would have a well-defined property right to the fish.A sole owner would want to maximize his or her profits.Figure 13.313.3 Appropriability And Market SolutionsOcean fisheries are typically common-property resources-no one exercises complete control over them.What problems arise when access t
10、o the fishery is completely unrestricted?13.3 Appropriability And Market SolutionsFree-access resources create two kinds of externalities:A contemporaneous externalityAn intergenerational externality13.3 Appropriability And Market SolutionsAre free-access resources and common-property resources syno
11、nymous concepts?On the one hand,governments can restrict entryOn the other hand,informal arrangements among those harvesting the common property resource can also serve to limit access as well.13.4 Public Policy Toward Fisheries休渔期捕捞证捕捞工具管制增殖放流AquacultureRaising the real cost of fishingTaxesIndividu
12、al transferable quotasThe 200-mile limitThe economics of enforcementFigure 13.4Objectives&Requirements:Understand the efficient allocation of fisheries Grasp the meaning of maximum sustainable yield Understand the allocation of fisheries under different property rights Understand the public policy t
13、oward fisheries Discussion:Assume that a local fisheries council imposes an enforceable quota of 100 tons of fish on a particular fishing ground for one year.Assume further that 100 tons per year is the efficient sustained yield.Once the 100th ton has been caught,the fishery would be closed for the
14、remainder of the year.Is this an efficient solution to the common-property problems?Why or why not?Would your answer be different if the 100-ton quota were divided up into 100 transferable quotas,each entitling the holder to catch one ton of fish,and distributed among the fishermen in proportion to their historical catch?Why or why not?
